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Department of East Asian Languages and Cultures 
The goal of my thesis is to investigate the nature of anti-Americanism in South Korea, a 
nation which has had a long and intricate relationship with the United States. Starting 
with a brief survey of anti-Americanism as a global phenomena and moving through 
important historical milestones in the evolution of anti-American sentiment I use socio-
historical research to get to the heart of what anti-Americanism means in South Korea. 
My research suggests that anti-Americanism as it exists in South Korea is not an 
ideological or deep seated hatred of the United States but rather an incidental component 
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The democratization of South Korea has brought with it spikes and surges in anti-
Americanism that seem to many Americans to be at odds with their understanding of 
South Korea. The word in Korean for the United States is Miguk (미국, 美國) which 
translates as “beautiful country,” an ironic description considering that in 2002, South 
Korea ranked behind only Bangladesh and Argentina for holding unfavorable attitudes 
towards the U.S. (McAdam 263).  While such attitudes may be difficult to reconcile from 
an American perspective, the unique composition of the modern South Korean 
sociopolitical environment addressed in this paper will help to illuminate the nature of 
anti-Americanism in South Korea. 
The relationship between the United States and Korea dates back more than 100 
years with the signing of the Shufeldt Treaty in 1883, which normalized relations 
between the Kingdom of Corea and the United States. Since that time, the Hermit 
Kingdom has undergone tremendous social and political upheaval on numerous 
occasions, from the end of a 500 year dynasty to experiencing colonization, civil war, 
cold war, authoritarian rule and most recently, democracy. The US and South Korea have 
shared a strong bond based upon mutual strategic trade and security issues since WWII 
and the partitioning of Korea into North and South. The United States was initially seen 
as beneficent savior from the communist threat immediately to the North, but South 
Korean perceptions towards the United States have begun to shift in recent decades. 
Many South Koreans feel that American policy makers have had a difficult time keeping 
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up with the rapid pace with which South Korean society has changed since the 1970s, 
relying heavily on an out dated Status of Forces Agreement that leaves the two nations on 
unequal footing, which has created a widening gap in the relations with what was once 
one of the United States’ staunchest allies.   
The central theme of my thesis is anti-Americanism in South Korea as it relates to 
a paradigm shift in national self-identity. This trend in the South Korean national 
consciousness is comprised of numerous intricate, interrelated issues that many have 
referred to as ‘anti-Americanism.’ I use several key historical events and trends to 
demonstrate the progression and evolution of modern Korean identity and its profound 
effect on the shaping of ‘anti-Americanism.’ By employing socio-historical research, I 
will seek to analyze the complex relationship between anti-Americanism and South 
Korean national identity. I intend to show that anti-Americanism in South Korea reflects 
and contributes to the formation of national identity.  
Anti-Americanism in South Korea is an issue that has received much attention in 
both western and Korean media as well as in scholarly circles in recent 
years. Undeniably, the United States and South Korea have close economic and strategic 
ties such that relations between the two countries have served as a powerful force in 
South Korean political and social spheres. Sensationalism surrounding anti-American 
sentiment has often pointed to the potential for anti-Americanism to cause serious 
disruption in multiple arenas of US-South Korean interaction as in the case of massive 
protests in late fall of 2002.  It is therefore important to understand the political and social 
constructs in which anti-Americanism exists to accurately define the nature of South 




South Korea has risen from the ashes of war and destitution to become the fourth largest 
economy in Asia. Such a rapid rise has produced a substantial chasm between those who 
grew up in abject poverty in the aftermath of the Korean War and those who have never 
known anything but relative affluence and privilege. As ideological reform has swept 
through South Korea, the political pendulum has been viewed by scholars such as Bruce 
Cummings as having begun to swing away from a right of center, anti-communist and 
pro-American stance to one that is more tolerant of dissent towards America and more 
accepting of North Korean sympathizers. With roots predating the colonization of the 
Korean peninsula by Japan, the relationship between the United States and Korea has 
always been a dynamic one. South Korea has undergone a myriad of transformations 
since the demarcation of the Demilitarized Zone at the thirty eighth Parallel, a division 
that symbolizes an ongoing ideological and territorial conflict between the sovereign 
nations of North and South Korea. The United States is inextricably linked to this most 
defining aspect of life on the Korean peninsula. Ideologically opposed to North Korea’s 
chuch’e sasang (주체사상, 主體思想- translates to self-reliance) brand of Marxism and 
communism throughout the Cold War, the United States operated under a policy of 
containment against the USSR and People’s Republic of China. Out of socio-political 
necessity, the United States and South Korea became fast allies as the Korean War drew 
to a close, forming strong and binding ties that continue to this day.  
Modern-day South Korea got its start as an impoverished and war-torn nation 
caught in the middle of an ideological struggle between superpowers during the 1950’s.  
South Korean perceptions and attitudes that initially embodied reverence for American 
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muscle and might slowly began to exhibit disenchantment with the United States. In 
some underground circles in the budding nation, the US was seen as a somewhat 
ambivalent ally that seemed content to use South Korea as a chess piece in a political 
stalemate between the global ambitions of capitalism and communism.  Under various 
authoritarian regimes and eventual democratic leadership, South Korea’s perceptions of 
the US exhibited a continuous ebb and flow that shifted throughout the political and 
social spectrum. Silently simmering with mounting frustration, anti-Americanism was 
fuel for a growing number of disaffected South Korean youth. Many felt a sense of 
helplessness and anger with perceived US complicity in the Kwangju Massacre, a student 
led movement in the early 1980’s for democracy that ended in slaughter.   
  Upon the arrival of democracy to the southern half of the Korean peninsula, the 
once muted voices of dissent and dissatisfaction with the United States began to vent 
anti-American sentiment without fear of recrimination. Some groups began to protest 
against the United States with increasing frequency and regularity. Recent events, such as 
the massive beef protests throughout South Korea, have given scholars cause to 
reexamine anti-Americanism in South Korea.  
The purpose of this study is to analyze anti-Americanism in South Korea and 
understand its socio-political underpinnings and manifestations. Understanding the nature 
of this sentiment is central to ensuring continued positive relations with Korea and the 
United States. In order to get to the root of such sentiment it is important to ask questions 
that dig deeper than 30 second news spots: What is anti-Americanism in South Korea?  
How wide spread is infiltration of anti-Americanism in various strata of Korean society? 
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How pervasive is such sentiment and what do these findings mean in terms of overall 
perceptions of the United States? 
In searching to comprehend sociopolitical concepts of ‘other’ and ‘anti,’ a 
window is opened into the very nature of national self-identity. Attempting to define and 
dissect anti-Americanism in South Korea, in all its complexities and various forms, offers 
the chance to prop open this window and peer into the soul of a nation.  If we are to move 
forward as allies, a careful and detailed analysis of anti-Americanism is essential to 
progress for both nations.   
  
Anti-Americanism in the World: Old and New  
The purpose of this survey is to provide a brief overview of anti-Americanism as it exists 
in other parts of the world in order to illustrate the point that such sentiments are not a 
new phenomenon, which will help to lay the groundwork for a comparative analysis of 
anti-American sentiment in South Korea. There is perhaps no single phrase in recent 
memory that has so saturated scholarly publications, garnered as much attention or been 
used as a rallying cry for so many disparate groups as anti-Americanism. The difficulty in 
pinning down an exact definition of anti-Americanism as a comprehensive concept 
becomes apparent upon even a cursory examination. Dislike for America as a form of 
cultural currency across numerous strata of society is nothing new and is perhaps in fact 
“as old as political modernity and could be said to be one of its founding discourses” 
(Ross and Ross 1). With roots dating back to the American Revolution, elite academic 
circles in Europe have often focused on America and all things American as an anathema 
to European sophistication and a divergence from their own cultural evolution and 
refinement.   
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In Europe, scholars of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries would often give 
voice to the view that there was something inherently bad about America; the mere fact 
of its existence tainted and rendered inferior everything associated with it. This “guilt by 
association” stance is the line of thinking that prompted French anthropologist Georges 
Louis Leclerq to assert that inhabitants of North America were predominantly “retarded 
and degenerate” (Markovits 31). In his view these backward characteristics were soon 
imbued upon immigrant populations to America shortly after arrival. This regression 
then, was considered emblematic of the New World, a land that took the culture of 
Europe and reduced it to a more barbaric “American” state.   
It is not hard to see echoes of such sentiment in European popular culture even 
today. Any discussion of French etiquette and tradition in comparison to that of the 
United States immediately conjures up notions of superiority and inferiority across the 
transatlantic divide.  The irony of such widely accepted disdain for things American is 
that America was a “European creation” which bore countless similarities to the nations 
which had carved out its existence but which had nevertheless “consciously defected 
from its European origins” (Markovits  23). In this sense, the ideological and social 
proximity to the United States can be seen as a motivator for the development of anti-
Americanism in Europe.  
Manifestations of anti-Americanism can be glimpsed on any given day during a 
typical broadcast on CNN or Fox News where images of flag burning in Tehran or 
outright violence against American troops in Baghdad have become almost cliché. In the 
minds of many Americans what is considered “anti-American” has been linked 
permanently with the Middle East since the tragic events of  9/11.  This perception is not 
 6
 
without merit, for in that part of the world, a longstanding discontent for America has 
spilled over into various segments of society. Rather than viewing such violence as acts 
of  extremism and terror, a view held by many Arabs is that anti-Americanism is nothing 
more than a “rational response to U.S. policies” (Lynch  202). Continued U.S. support of 
Israel and the decision by the U.S. to go to war against Iraq under the Bush 
administration are two primary issues that have only served to solidify negative views 
towards America in the eyes of many in the Middle East. In the Arab world, “anti-
Americanism has become far more intense and widespread in response to the increasing 
fear of U.S. power, driven by the combination of an increasingly present United States 
and a negative normative evaluation of American intentions” (Lynch 199). It is thanks in 
part to this growing sentiment that extremist jihadist groups have been able to recruit in 
such staggering numbers in recent years.  
The reasons and motivations behind various forms of anti-Americanism can 
encompass as broad a range ideologically as each respective entity is geographically.  To 
give one example of the diverse divide of disdain “[i]n Islamic fundamentalist circles, the 
United States is castigated for being the embodiment of modernity, but Europeans accuse 
it of not being modern (or postmodern) enough-for practicing capital punishment and for 
believing too much in God” (Krastev  6).  Such seemingly opposing approaches to anti-
Americanism are primary examples of the difficulty in dissecting it as a concept.  
In the Far East, anti-Americanism exists as a somewhat different entity.  Often 
written off by conservative media pundits as an extension of perceived Chinese 
xenophobia, anti-Americanism as witnessed today can trace its origins back to “the 
violence of the turn of the twentieth century” (Karl 236). Many Chinese citizens today 
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view the United States as a transgressor who “habitually badgers their pride, belittles 
their accomplishments,” and violates their sense of “national sovereignty, and attempts to 
thwart the rise of their country’s international influence” (Ma 2). 
Even in Japan, one of America’s strongest allies, events such as the periodic 
protests against U.S. forces stationed in Japan serve to remind an otherwise enamored 
public of the persistence of perceived inferiority to the United States that always bubbles 
beneath the surface, a painful remnant of the failure of Japan’s once ambitious imperial 
past. In response Japan has recently given rise to a cultural “etiquette (saho) of anti-
Americanism” that attempts to reconcile a sense of “subordination” to the U.S. by 
crafting a relationship that relies on respective “difference and the recognition of 
equality” (Harootunian 201).  In this sense, the legacy of American occupation is still a 
part of modern Japanese society.  
Anti-Americanism as a phenomenon has existed almost as long as there has been 
an America. Initially seen as a European reaction to the existence of the U.S., anti-
Americanism has become a truly global occurrence, stretching across multiple strata of 
society. It is with this in mind that we examine what such sentiment means.  
 
Approaches to Anti-Americanism 
Now that a cursory survey of the history and breadth of anti-Americanism has provided 
glimpses of this phenomenon as it has existed, the next step is to understand some of the 
ways scholars have attempted to comprehend and analyze the nature of anti-
Americanism. Broadly speaking, approaches to anti-Americanism fall into two camps: 
resistance theory and scapegoating. On the scapegoating front there are those who are 
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‘anti-anti-Americanism’ proponents, tending to see all things anti-American as an 
irrational response to American exceptionalism which is to say “—the idea that the 
United States is radically different  from and, in the more common formulations, superior 
to—other countries” (Tyrrell 100).  Scholars of this ilk tend to dismiss anti-Americanism 
from other nations as an emotional response to the unprecedented influence and power of 
the United States in modern history.  Academic proponents of this view “attribute anti-
Americanism to psychological problems, a kind of neurosis rooted in the ‘envy’ of 
America’s great wealth and power” (Friedman 498).  
When discussing a European manifestation of anti-Americanism, for example, 
Pascal Bruckner argues that one should understand that anti-Americanism for all its 
vehemence “is not a criticism of America, of its mistakes, its faults, or its crimes” 
(Bruckner 16).  Rather it is an “autonomous view” that is circular in reasoning and is 
sustained by an interpretation of events that will serve to “confirm or reinforce” its 
legitimacy regardless of whether or not such events actually support or contradict 
accepted reasons for anti-Americanism (Ibid 16). This approach does not acknowledge 
legitimate criticism of American policy or actions, but instead views anti-Americanism as 
something akin to an inferiority complex by those who align themselves with anti-
American ideologies or attitudes. Paul Hollander, one of the most adamant proponents of 
this school of thought believes that “the scapegoating impulse is central to anti-
Americanism, followed by envy and ambivalence” (Hollander 4).  Looking at anti-
Americanism more as a reflection of some inner failure or flaw which is too difficult to 
internalize, this view suggests that “Anti-Americanism as a by-product of nationalistic 
grievances, resentments, and competitive disadvantage is among its most prominent 
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incarnations” (Hollander 6).   By grouping anything ‘anti-American into the “irrationally 
against us” category, the implication then seems to assume that there are only two camps 
to which one can belong: if one is not ‘for us’ then one is ‘against us.’ To reiterate the 
claim of failure on the part of the ‘other’ integral to this understanding of anti-
Americanism, Hollander asserts that “[w]eakness is a major stimulant of anti-
Americanism” which has its roots in pre-existing circumstances which are by and large 
“unrelated to the actual qualities or attributes of American society, institutions, values, or 
foreign policy” (Hollander 6). Such weakness, then, is the fault of those who hold these 
types of views against America and not the converse.  
Another approach is to see anti-Americanism as a reaction to “Americanism” or 
perceived American power, foreign policy, even the very ideological constructs upon 
which America is founded. According to John Kane, a reaction to Americanism 
constitutes a  “prophetic idealism” which is “…at the heart of American identity that 
makes ‘Americanism’ a genuinely ideological term and that makes ‘anti-Americanism’ 
something more than a natural reaction of foreign peoples to preponderant, often 
overbearing American power” (Kane 29). In this sense, anti-Americanism can be likened 
to other “anti-isms” such as anti-communism or anti-fascism in that “one resists, not just 
a country, but an idea” (Ibid 29). The central issue to Kane is that the mythology of an 
idealized America—the promise of a better world that can only be found in America—
clashes severely with America’s schizophrenic nationalism, an ever-prevalent hypocrisy 
that embodies both the altruistic ‘pursuit of happiness’ and ‘equality’ with latent racism, 
obsession with materialism and its perceived hegemonic agenda. This line of thought 
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supposes that anti-Americanism stems from America not being able to live up to its own 
ideals, as a particular type of moral failure on the part of the United States.  
Following a similar vein but expanding the notion of ‘America’ beyond the 
actions of Americans and their government to a political construct, Haig Patapan believes 
that there is a theoretical conceptualization of America, that incurs the wrath of anti-
Americanists “because it represented, and still claims to be, an ambitious political 
experiment” (Patapan 55). Extending beyond derision that stems from a palpable and 
measurable failure on the part of America to fulfill its self-described destiny, this 
“philosophical” approach to anti-Americanism purports to exist as a “critique of 
modernity” the very embodiment of which America claims to be. Elaborating on this idea 
further, one can view America and Americanism as a political manifestation of “modern 
political thought” or even “more generally modernity” (Ibid 61).  It is Patapan’s 
conclusion that “the great experiment that is America will always be shadowed by a 
critical anti-Americanism” (Ibid 71).  No matter what America does then, anti-
Americanism is bound to follow. 
While scholars who view anti-Americanism as a more serious and difficult social 
construct warn of a persistent and growing split in global society, there are those who see 
such proclamations as excitations of the ‘Chicken Little’ variety. Rather than cause for 
overwhelming concern, such skeptics take the position that “the current notion of 
Americanism is to a great extent the invention of anti-American discourse” and owing to 
this fact  “any specific political context and any political discourse can invent its own 
version of America as a hate object” (Krastev 7). Americanism then, could be seen more 
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as a tool by “anti-Americanists” to further an ideological agenda than an actual 
internalized hatred of an American ideal perpetually doomed to fall short of its mark.  
Still others argue that despite the terrorist attacks of 2001, anti-Americanism is 
much less serious than the alarmist camp would have us believe. From this persepective, 
anti-Americanism is less an entrenched ideology than it is a resistance to policy based on 
real life experiences, which can fluctuate with changing administrations. When taking 
this approach, it can be argued that “using anti-Americanism to explain the cause of 
opposition to U.S. policies does not just put the cart before the horse; it says the cart is 
the horse—it reverses causality” (Friedman 504). According to this model, such 
confusions of causality would have profound implications for any evaluation of anti-
Americanism as the basic premise upon which “cart equals horse” assessments are made 
and would be considered inherently flawed.  
When assessing the various schools of thought on anti-Americanism, pros and 
cons of each approach are readily apparent. Examining the ‘irrational’ component of anti-
Americanism is almost intuitive. What rational individuals would devise and orchestrate 
such a vicious attack on innocent Americans as we witnessed on September 11th 2001?   
So then, if such actions are irrational, the result of extreme expressions of misallocated 
internal distress and envy of the worlds last ‘superpower,’ why do certain policy 
decisions seem to elicit more extreme responses than others? Does this mean that every 
protest against the U.S. government is a disproportionate response to policy or baseless 
attack on a nation which is merely the victim of its own success?  This analysis is too 
polarizing and is too broad in stroke. While there are no doubt groups who hate America 
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in large part because of it's success, it is simply not plausible to believe that is the case in 
every situation.  
Is anti-Americanism then merely resistance to policy? Certainly there have been 
spikes in anti-American sentiment that have appeared to coincide with policy decisions, 
such as the 2003 invasion of Iraq. However this perspective also misses the mark and 
assumes that policy alone is the most accurate predictor of anti-Americanism.  This belief 
does not take into consideration individuals, groups and governments who need a 
scapegoat no matter what the United States is doing abroad. As one of only a few 
superpowers, the U.S. is their last, best target to advance their own causes.  
Similarly, America as a moral failure, a social experiment gone awry or the 
embodiment of a philosophy that provokes an antagonistic ideology among its detractors 
all describe conceivable ways in which anti-Americanism is manifest. However, each 
approach only explains away one piece of the puzzle, offering insight into one corner of a 
complex labyrinth of thoughts, attitudes and ideologies. This is not to suggest that any 
one perspective is without merit, but rather a more inclusive examination of anti-
Americanism is required in order to peel away at the multiple layers that comprise this 
contested concept. Anti-Americanism as a global phenomenon is not one thing or another 
but rather it is many things in many places at the same time.   
 
South Korean Anti-Americanism 
In South Korea, the complexities of anti-Americanism are part of numerous intricate 
social and political realities. Amidst a noticeable increase in sound-bite friendly protest 
cries of “Yankee go home” and images of thousands of South Koreans gathering to 
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demonstrate against the importation of American beef, a growing consensus in the field 
of Korean/American relations has begun to move toward deconstructing anti-
Americanism.  Upon examining the various theoretical and analytical approaches taken 
such a shift, evidence of a polarizing debate emerges. A collection of papers from a 
conference on anti-Americanism from 2004 illustrates this point. Ronald Meinardus 
observed that when comparing a rise of anti-Americanism in South Korea to that of 
decline in Germany, such sentiments are “more structural” in South Korea, framed by 
“U.S. inspired policy decisions” that have “opened the door to the accusation of 
unilateralism” (Meinardus 86).  Meinardus posits that it is the way in which Korean and 
American relations are framed in bilateralism that allows for a rejection of the United 
States when perceived as acting unilaterally in its own interests.  In his paper entitled 
“The Structural Basis of ‘anti-Americanism,” Bruce Cummings addresses potential 
causes of anti-Americanism as rooted in more ingrained political and social elements, 
citing issues such as a post-Korean war “unspoken policy” of racism and more recently a 
Korean surge of “anti-Bushism”(Cummings 97-101). A 2004 report focused on anti-
Americanism released by the Rand corporation suggests that “South Koreans’ attitudes 
toward the U.S. were systematically associated with beliefs about the state of US-
relations…” (Larson et al. 119), a dynamic which is part of a larger continuum. This 
would seem to imply that there is something pervasive and inherent in the current 
sociopolitical spheres of South Korean and American interaction that is conducive to 
anti-Americanism. In other words, anti-Americanism as seen when manifested in the 
form of protest to a specific event can be viewed as an expression of a pre-existing 
discontent for the United States that has been brought to the surface.  
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Conversely, some hold the view that anti-Americanism does not exist in the true 
definition of the term, but rather is a misunderstood series of reactions to events that do 
not necessarily follow a linear progression. Kim Sung-Han asserts that one common 
expression of anti-Americanism is “popular anti-Americanism, which tends to be 
episodic and exists among those who respond to events in an emotional manner.” (Kim S. 
195).  In his work entitled “Anti-Americanism and the U.S Role in Inter-Korean 
Relations,” Victor Cha explains that to the thousands of candle light protesters 
demonstrating over the accidental death of two school girls by US tanks, such actions 
were not “anti-American per se but…the expression of a new Korean identity.” He goes 
on to state that anti-Americanism is a “much more contested and far less one-dimensional 
notion than popular perception gives it credit for” (Cha 116). This approach suggests that 
misunderstanding is the primary causative force behind American reaction to perceived 
acts of anti-Americanism and the issue is not so clearly black and white.  
It is this multi-faceted nature of anti-Americanism that presents such a daunting 
challenge to understanding this phenomenon. The reasons for its existence, the factors 
that have allowed anti-Americanism to thrive, and the public and policy decisions that 
continually shape and define this particular South Korean brand of anti-Americanism are 
all essential to comprehending and defining anti-Americanism in South Korea.   
In the words of Chung-in Moon, anti-Americanism “has been by and large 
misunderstood,” and although  South Korean anti-Americanism “as an ideological 
phenomenon has visibly dwindled,” episodic instances of anti-Americanism appear 
sporadically  “and democratic maturity and civic alertness to American exceptionalism 
…could easily escalate into anti-American movements” (Moon C. 147). The evolution 
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and progression of such movements, sentiments and ideologies deserve analysis and 







































Chapter One  
 
The Kwangju Uprising 
     
O Kwangju, and Mudung Mountain.  
Between death and more death,  
City of our eternal youth, flowing  
with blood and tears! 
 
(Translation found at http://www.hrsolidarity.net/mainfile.php/1999vol09no05/958/ accessed November 20th 2008) 
 
 Arguably the most profound change of the last fifty years in the US-ROK 
relationship has been the path to democratization.  While a democratic government was 
technically instituted in 1987, it has taken decades for the “full impact of democratization 
to work its way through Korean government and society in practice” (Snyder 9).  An 
element of primary concern to the relationship between the US and ROK is the “growing 
influence of South Korean public opinion on its foreign policy orientation” (Ibid 10).   
 There are many forces at work shaping public opinion and South Korea’s struggle 
to come to grips with a fractured identity riddled with an authoritarian and colonized past. 
“[I]n this light, the growth and popularization of the anti-American movement in the late 
1990’s and early 2000s is a consequence of democratization and marks a major stride 
forward in the politics of democratic deepening” (Moon K. 141).  The most profound 
force over the last twenty years that has shaped the discourse of anti-Americanism is that 
of the Kwangju uprising – an event that has permeated throughout every strata in Korean 
society. In the popular culture in the novella, “There a Petal Silently Falls,” renowned 
author Ch’oe Yun uses prose to address the tragedy of Kwangju. Her narrative is rich in 
unexpected descriptions that are written with a hauntingly beautiful elegance that 
conveys a sense of aching sorrow and deep unimaginable loss: 
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Clouds covered the moonless sky like the huge wings of a scavenging bird. 
Among them were a few stars, twinkling painfully, spots of pus from a sore, 
bringing goose bumps to the back of my neck (Ch’oe 27). 
In the story the main character is a young girl who lost her mother during the 
Kwangju massacre and witnessed her death. She becomes something of a living ghost 
after she sees her mother lying in the street. From that point on the girl becomes lost in a 
blurred state of reality, a twilight existence in which she is listless, confused, afraid and 
often lacking the will to live. Malnourished and detached from the world, she stumbles 
through the countryside wandering, vaguely aware that she wants to find her brother-who 
may be dead-and tell him about their mother. The haunting sense of loss and tragedy 
woven throughout the tale is a metaphor for the pain felt by all of those who suffered as a 
result of the Kwangju uprising. 
The importance of understanding the Kwangju uprising is that it “fundamentally 
altered Koreans’ view of the United States” (Shin 512). Largely considered one of the 
first major iterations of anti-Americanism to firmly take root in South Korea, disdain for 
the United States circa 1980 is inextricably and ironically tied to one of the most 
renowned pro-democratic movements in South Korean history. Second in infamy only to 
the March 1st movement of 1919 in which scores of Koreans were killed while protesting 
Japanese rule, the Kwangju massacre in May of 1980 burns brightly in the collective 
Korean consciousness. With reverberations still felt in the cultural currents of Korean 
society “the tipping point for the anti-Americanism now so prominently on display in 
South Korea, was the brutal suppression of a popular uprising in the southwestern city of 
Kwangju in May 1980” (Drennan 280).  The summer of 1980 was a tumultuous time in 
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Korean politics. Growing public unrest with continued authoritarian rule culminated in 
the assassination of Park Chung-hee in late 1979, marking the end of an eighteen year 
dictatorship. 
 As the country tottered precariously on a political precipice of uncertainty, a 
majority of South Koreans favored moving the nation towards democracy.  Unsure how 
best to proceed the process stalled and activists soon took to the streets. Taking advantage 
of the nation’s lack of direction, a South Korean general Chun Doo-Wan quickly 
performed a series of chess-like maneuvers that sought to establish himself as the next 
dictator of South Korea. A distinctive ideological counterpoint to these intentions, 
widespread student and civil protests soon gripped South Korea demanding the repeal of 
martial law which had been implemented after Park’s assassination. Over 100,000 
students gathered at Seoul Station on May 15th in protest of martial law and Chun’s 
military grip on the nation. Seeking to decisively quell the pro-democratic movement, 
Chun cracked down on dissent, dispatching troops to areas of dissent. Fearing military 
reprisal in Seoul, student leaders relented and regrouped to strategize. The military 
crackdown further enraged residents of Kwangju, South Chŏlla province-then a city of 
approximately 800,000-roughly three hours south of Seoul. Historically exploited for its 
natural resources, south Chŏlla province has a long history of difficult relations with 
Seoul and had not prospered under Park’s 1972 Yushin reform push for industrialization. 
Home to democratic leader and frequent political prisoner Kim Dae Jung, Kwangju soon 
became a hub of pro-democratic activity. Students and citizens took to the streets en 
masse on the 18th of May. After being blocked and beaten by military troops at the gate 
of Chŏnnam University the students marched downtown where they were followed by the 
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troops who this time used even greater amounts of violence against the students, resulting 
in the first casualties.  Enraged by the lethal tactics employed by the military, more 
protesters took to the streets numbering well over 100, 000 by the 20th of May (Lewis 6). 
The death of civilians  brought a sense of  panic and desperate urgency to Kwangju as 
illustrated in the following excerpt from field notes written by an American 
anthropologist (then graduate student Linda Lewis) studying in Southern Cholla Province 
who witnessed the events firsthand: 
They’re killing people down here today-again. Lots died yesterday, too, although I didn’t 
find out about it until today. . . Mother came panting in . . . semi-hysterical. On the main 
drag (Kumnamno) she had seen a student bayoneted, front to back and thrown on a police 
van… (ibid 6) 
By the 22nd of May protesters had begun to arm themselves with weapons 
confiscated from nearby towns.  A carnivalesque atmosphere with ominous overtones 
descended upon Kwangju as large groups of protesters clashed with police and military 
for control of the city. These clashes had become more than civil unrest. The people of 
Kwangju (by virtue of their stand against subjugation) had become the defacto voice of 
the South Korean people. 1980 was a year of unrest and possibility and the citizens of 
Korea were in the midst of seeking to re-chart the course of their history which had been 
fraught with victimization at the hands of the state in its various incarnations. The fierce 
spirit of the oppressed had been suppressed for too long. Signs and protest songs had 
ceased to be effective instruments for resistance. In May of 1980 South Koreans in 
Cholla province became active participants in a push to exist as more than the recipients 
of history they were unable to shape. With weapons in hand, against seemingly 
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insurmountable odds the people of Kwangju were, at least temporarily, motivated actors 
seeking to directly impact and redefine their fate. 
A convoy of taxicabs charged military blockades in reprisal for the brutal 
treatment they had received when trying to transport wounded civilians to nearby 
hospitals.  Events continued to escalate and a Time correspondent in Kwangju at the time 
was overcome with a sense of “an impending danger: with the youthful protesters 
stockpiling weapons, and troops encircling the city, Kwangju could turn into a 
bloodbath” (Time 35).  Taking control of Kwangju city hall and repelling military forces 
to the outskirts of the city, the armed protestors and the military became locked in a 
standoff that lasted for days.  Group infighting among the various civilian factions stalled 
negotiations. The uprising came to an end with a swiftly carried out military assault on 
the insurrection resulting in the deaths and capture of many of the movements’ leaders.  
Frustrations throughout the uprising ran high. During the unrest, Chun had 
effected a media blackout and cordoned off the city, cutting phone lines and surrounding 
Kwangju with military forces. In essence, the uprising of Kwangju was happening in 
isolation from the rest of Korea. The success of Chun in hiding the massacre kept the 
uprising from spreading to other parts of the nation. Alone but determined, the residents 
of Kwangju had put up an admirable fight against a much more well equipped and 
resourceful adversary.  
Compounding the frustrations of the absence of national attention and support 
was the sense of astonishment at the lack of U.S. intervention. A common sentiment 
shared among those active in the protests was the inevitability of the United States to step 
in and  to stand up for democracy and defend against the abuse of human rights. South 
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Koreans had by and large understood that the Status of Forces Agreement which 
governed relations between the U.S. and South Korea would protect them from abuses of 
power by the Korean military. Reflecting on her experiences during the Kwangju 
uprising, Lewis noted that “[a]s a U.S. citizen, in the early days of the uprising I was 
continually questioned, not with hostility but with dismay and confusion about the 
apparent lack of an American response” (Lewis 18).  Not well versed in the complexities 
and intricate nuances of operational control vs. command, the average Korean citizens 
assumed that the soldiers dispatched to Kwangju did so under the authority of the United 
States. 
 In actuality, special paratroopers were sent in specifically because they were 
national troops who functioned outside the purview of American authority as the U.S. 
essentially had “responsibility without control” (qtd in Drennan 293). It is precisely this 
point that is at the heart of understanding the rise of anti-Americanism after Kwangju. 
There are some American scholars who contend that the U.S. should be held accountable 
for allowing Kwangju to happen even if it was not technically possible to intervene 
believing “you don’t have to pull the trigger to be responsible for the crime” (Shorrock 
128). This understanding of the issues is indicative of the type of misinformation 
campaign that began to take root in Korea following the massacre, a direct result of the 
asymmetrical power relationship between the U.S. and Korea and the understand of that 
relationship held by most Koreans. The United States had no control over the Special 
Forces deployed to Kwangju and was not ina position to stop the detachment from 
deploying. Scholars who held the United States accountable for inaction regardless of 
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whether or not such action was possible only contributed to the growing uncertainty 
surrounding perceived U.S. complicity in Kwangju.  
  In the subsequent weeks and months after the uprising, half-truths about the role 
of the United States in Kwangju began to snowball. Fed by a government eager to shift 
blame and responsibility away from itself, new attitudes towards the United States began 
to form.  An elderly woman protesting the U.S. not long after the uprising remarked 
''[p]eople in Korea believed that Americans are angels. We thought that you saved Korea 
from colonial rule under the Japanese. We believed in Americans as models of 
democracy'' (Stokes, NY Times). Echoing a sentiment that was just beginning to take root 
in South Korean thought she asserted that “suddenly your image changed overnight. We 
could see a demonic aspect. You were Satan all of a sudden. Now there is hatred and fear 
among people in Kwangju'' (Stokes NY Times). In this sense it was not the United States 
in and of itself that was the focus of the sudden shift in perception. There was not an 
ideological opposition to the values and norms of American society. Rather the US, 
which had been revered in modern Korean society, had been caught, unbeknownst to 
most Americans, in the socio-political turmoil raging through South Korea in the 1980s. 
For the purposes of the protests of the US and the Korean military that followed, it did 
not matter that the boots of soldiers were strapped to American feet but that they were 
perceived as marching in step with the oppressive regime.  
Thus, the immediate effect of the Kwangju massacre was that “for Koreans [it] 
became a turning point to seriously reconsider the meaning of the US to South Korea” 
(Kim Y. 115). The aftermath of the Kwangju uprising and Korean perception of 
American involvement marked the birth of modern anti-Americanism in South Korea. 
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Having just witnessed one of the bloodiest events since the Korean war “[t]he tragedy of 
Gwangju made students and anti-government activists believe that social justice could 
not be achieved so long as the US government backed up the military government of 
South Korea” (ibid 115).  
 The events of Kwangju ostensibly linked the U.S. to a bloody autocratic 
suppression. Before Kwangju “the United States was viewed by many Koreans as the 
‘beautiful nation,’ the country that had saved Korea from communist conquest and that 
continued to provide indispensable protection after the armistice” (Drennan 254). It is 
argued by Glassman, Park and Choi that after Kwangju a broad spectrum of political 
thought had been infiltrated by such sentiment giving rise to a revisionist approach to 
history. Such an approach touched upon collective remembrances such as the Korean war 
where “U.S. involvement in the war [was] now dismissed by many (especially young 
Koreans)  as just another example of the American Pursuit of self-interest in its fight 
against communism” (ibid 254).  Such interest was often regarded as contrary to the 
needs of the Korean people. Essentially, “[t]he Gwangju crackdown brought to the 
surface the anti-American. . . ideology that had been a political taboo in postcolonial 
Korean society as students and intellectuals began to question U.S. support for the 
dictatorship” (Glassman, Park and Choi 354). This dictatorship was viewed with 
increasing distrust and disdain in the eyes of many Koreans who turned the focus of their 
ire to the next most obvious suspect, the United States.  Such sentiment was not born of a 
hatred of all things American, but part of an ongoing commitment to a new 
historiography free from domination, the latest obstacle to which (in the minds of many) 
happened to be America.  
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Prior to the events of 5.18 in South Korea, anti-Americanism was mostly 
relegated to the left-leaning segment of the Korean political sphere. Activist groups that 
were opposed to authoritarian regimes resented perceived US complicity in the bloody 
suppression of the Kwangju student uprising of 1980. Such groups had begun to make 
inroads into campuses across the nation but remained largely an underground movement. 
Under strict, government-imposed censorship and lack of tolerance for those espousing 
“anti-US sentiment, state controls on the press censored media coverage of stories that 
painted the U.S. in a negative light” (Oh and Celeste 336).  Furthermore the post-Korean 
war/anti-communist climate fostered an “anti-leftist system within the environment of 
Cold War confrontation [that] significantly restricted domestic political discourse until 
democratization in 1987 by restricting political rights and opposition activities” (ibid 
336).   
Government suppression of burgeoning ideological rifts in perceptions of the 
United States only succeeded in temporarily removing anti-Americanism from the larger 
context of legitimate socio-political discourse. After Kwangju, firm roots of anti-
American sentiment had been planted in the fringes of society and were beginning to 
grow towards the mainstream segments of society. These roots have led some scholars to 
conclude that “grasping the connection of the 1980s pro-democracy movements with 
ideological anti-Americanism is central to comprehending the true nature of anti-







However violent the clashes between anti-American factions of the protest movement 
and police became and despite the pervasiveness of intellectual anti-Americanism that 
dominated campuses across Korea, it is important to retrace the development of anti-
Americanism to see it for what it is. Prior to 1980, a culture of anti-Americanism was 
profoundly absent from Korean society. The Kwangju uprising and the misunderstanding 
of the role of the United States forced many Koreans to reassess the way in which they 
viewed the U.S. Still suffering the pains of decolonization, and growing weary of 
dictatorship after dictatorship a movement began to try to heal the wounds of the nation 
in terms of both a difficult past and an increasingly intolerable present. That anti-
Americanism was a function of this movement is really no surprise. Although Kwangju 
was the impetus, the close ties between South Korea and the United States’ support of 
authoritarian regimes would likely have surfaced sooner or later. In the case of Kwangju, 
Koreans did not express anti-American sentiments because they hated America. Instead 
anti-Americanism was—by virtue of the role of the US in modern Korean history—
simply an expression of a more complicated search for an overarching story or 
worldview.  
The events of Kwangju were not acts of anti-Americanism, but rather the catalyst 
that allowed anti-Americanism to play a prominent role in the social movements of the 
1980s. Without Kwangju, anti-Americanism may have never become such a dominant 
discourse among the anti-state factions before democratization in South Korea. That a 
single event could hold such transformative power is indicative of the true nature of anti-
Americanism in South Korea. That is to say, anti-Americanism as evidenced by the case 
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of the Kwangju uprising is a collective reaction triggered by a specific event; as such, 
anti-Americanism was incidental to the social movements of the 1980s not the causative 
force that defined them.  While there was almost certainly a shared belief among 
adherents to the various social movements of the 1980s, America was not the enemy in 
South Korea as it was in North Korea. Even at its zenith in the 80s, anti-Americanism 

































Chapter Two  
 
The Minjung Movement: Shaping anti-Americanism 
 
 
The literal translation into English for minjung (민중, 民衆) is ‘the people’ but there 
is no equivalent that captures the complex nuanced Korean meaning. A hodgepodge 
collection of “nationalism, Marxism, left-Catholic liberation theology, anti-dependency 
economic views, pacifist and antinuclear slogans, national reunification demands and 
West European-style peace advocacy” this movement garnered strong student support 
and was a rejection of “perceived US hegemonic collusion with Korean dictatorships” 
(Hwang  63).  Minjung ideology offered a revisionist and interventionist approach to 
history and sought to explain the Korean sense of victimization. Although the phrase was 
not coined until the 1980s, in typical minjung style, social activism from the 19th century 
onward was retroactively fitted with the minjung moniker and appropriated into the 
minjung movement as part of a reassessment of a historiography many saw as in need a 
cohesive and progressive direction.  
  The term minjung has been used to describe a people, theology, historiography, 
an ideology, literature, movement an intellectual discourse and numerous other 
manifestations that thrived in the 1980s. The people who made up the minjung movement 
came from all walks of life: from student protesters clamoring for democracy to 
struggling farmers trying to shuck the yoke of tenant law, from ivory tower intellectuals 
seeking to re-contextualize Korean historiography to everyday citizens left behind during 
Korea’s rapid industrialization. And yet there is an overarching theme to what it meant to 
be minjung. A sense of disenfranchisement from the state-manufactured status-quo, a 
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collective desire to struggle against entrenched and corrupt power structures, a shared 
urgency to shatter complacent paradigms that failed to adequately articulate what it meant 
to be Korean— all of these were common elements of minjung. The struggle of the 
minjung was not a class struggle in the sense of the proletariat rising up against the 
bourgeois, but rather a struggle of the suffering (Wells 13). The workers did suffer, but so 
too did the “students, teachers, writers, artists and journalists [whose] socioeconomic 
positions differ[ed] significantly from those of the workers” (Ibid 14).  
This suffering, or ‘Koreans as victims’ solidarity between classes extended 
beyond socioeconomic pains. Regardless of social status, all minjung suffered “under the 
implementation of values that they all find alienating” (Ibid 14). For minjung 
historiography this suffering stretched back in time and sought to reconcile a past fraught 
with colonization, civil war, the pain of a national identity carved out by larger forces and 
the cold realities of dictatorship. If Korean history is seen through this lens –a people who 
are casualties of forces outside of their control again and again – then it is easier to 
understand the burning desire to play the victim no more and rise up against the 
autocratic regime and take power from the latest tyrant in a long series of oppressors and 
at long last return Korea to the people.  
The events of Kwangju helped to ignite the fire of the minjung movement in 
popular culture. A government that would brutally suppress its own people, even a 
government that had brought relative prosperity to a former third world nation could not 
be tolerated. It was the pairing of the United States with the Kwangju massacre that 
brought a strong anti-American component to the minjung movement. The minjung 
wanted to topple the regime and in the eyes of many, America had blood on its hands 
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from perceived collusion with the dictatorship. However, “the minjung movement as a 
whole took painstaking care to show that its criticism was directed to the U.S. 
government’s policies and actions only” (Lee 112). Rather than protesting the American 
people or ‘American values’ or culture, the minjung movement took issue with the 
policies of a nation seen as governing with hypocrisy and that supported freedom and 
democracy only when convenient.  The 1980s saw the exponential growth of the minjung 
movement with student demonstrations occurring with ever-increasing frequency and 
becoming bolder and brasher in expression – including a three-day occupation of the 
United States Information Service (USIS) building in Seoul in May of 1985 and the 
seizure of several regional offices of the Ministry of Labor later that November.  
 
 
Authoritarianism and minjung 
  
The minjung movement thought of itself as the voice of the people and as such struggled 
to secure the wishes of the people, the overwhelming majority of whom longed for the 
democratization of South Korea. Resistance to the successive authoritarian dictatorships 
which had dominated South Korea since its inception was a defining aspect of the 
minjung philosophy. Beginning with Japanese colonial rule a “separation of the state and 
society” had started to set in, as the authority of the state began to embody rule by “alien 
power” as opposed to “moral authority” (Koo Civil 40). This political shift served to 
engender a pronounced “anti-state orientation” that became a cornerstone of  Korean 
intellectual thought and identity (Ibid 40).  This orientation only increased following the 
Korean War. Although touted by its leaders as a democracy, with brief exceptions from 
1948 until 1987 South Korea was a nation under a continuum of dictatorships. An 
artificially partitioned land divided at the 38th parallel provided the perfect backdrop for a 
 30
 
series of autocratic regimes. This “political development in Korea continuously denied 
the Korean people opportunities to restructure state power according to their nationalist 
ideals and democratic political values” (Ibid 40). Such a lack of opportunity brought with 
it an extreme sense of  frustration that had begun “with the end of colonial rule, which 
brought not a genuine liberation but another form of foreign domination, unwanted 
national division, and the revival of the old power and the colonial apparatuses of 
control” (Ibid 40). Under the iron-fisted and militaristic thumb of South Korean rulers, 
any and all abuse of human and civil rights were easily explained away as necessary to 
combat the threat of communist incursion from the North. The bloody civil war that 
pitted the former Japanese colony against itself in 1950 served to cement the claim to 
power of Sygman Rhee who had lacked in popular support before the war. Rhee was a 
brutal autocrat who had slaughtered thousands of his own citizens shortly after the 
creation of South Korea, in the name of stability. Although the Rhee government was 
largely seen as a weak puppet regime of the U.S. before 1950, a cultivated fear of 
communism eventually worked its way into the psyche of the public, giving Rhee the 
legitimacy he sought. 
The goal of the Rhee Regime was simply to maintain power at all costs. Portrayed 
in starkly black and white absolutes, Rhee’s implied message was clear: if you are against 
us you are with the communists.  To those in power there was no greater sin than that of 
siding with the Red North. Owing to the communist scare, fear became the modus 
operandi of the South Korean government, the primary currency in which freedoms were 
purchased and sold, the essential staple of the socio-political diet. The government told 
the people to fear the Reds from the North, but an even greater fear was the perception of 
 31
 
collusion from those in power in the South. Citizens were afraid of being seen as 
communist sympathizers or supporters, offenses which could result in grave 
consequences. Rhee’s success lay in his ability to accuse “the government’s critics of 
communist sympathies or of cooperating with the communists [which] proved effective 
in focusing these fears and silencing dissent” (Sohn 17).  
  The constant squeeze of corruption, tyranny and fear that had gripped South 
Korea during the Rhee presidency could not stifle the sense of growing unrest among the 
general populace forever. On April 19th 1960, students and workers filled the streets in 
protest of the Rhee regime’s brutal rule. In massive numbers, protesters gave a show of 
force so passionate and powerful that their efforts culminated in the ousting of President 
Rhee. His political demise was paradoxically “an inglorious end to a distinguished 
political career that included, ironically, his own role as a street demonstrator sixty-two 
years earlier” (Kim in Rhee Intro 5) when he had protested against the Yi monarchy. 
Rhee’s ousting gave rise to a parliamentary democracy on April 26th 1960.  Largely 
considered the foundation of the modern South Korean student movement, the events of 
4.19 cemented in place the role of students as active participants in the push for social 
and political reform.  
Although the April 19th movement was a success, the new government was 
ineffectual and lacked legitimacy with the people. After a nearly a year of political chaos 
and floundering, Park Chung Hee rose to power in a bloodless coup, with the backing of 
the newly established KCIA (Korean Counter Intelligence Agency, an organization 
tasked with suppressing opposition to President Park using whatever means necessary). 
The President set out to move Korea from a 3rd world nation to an industrial powerhouse. 
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His efforts were extremely successful, with the South Korean annual household income 
increasing twenty-fold under his direction. These advances came at a tremendous cost, 
however. Increasingly dictatorial, personal freedoms (which had never truly had an 
opportunity to flourish) continued to evaporate during his presidency.   
Narrow wins against rival political groups prompted President Park to suspend the 
South Korean constitution which had been established in 1963, and establish the Yusin 
constitution.  The rationale for this change was a state of national emergency and the 
need to defend South Korea in this time of international crisis. The implementation of the 
Yusin constitution relied on an electoral college with seven year presidential terms and 
no limit to the number of terms a president could serve. Noted for its “severe restrictions 
on people’s basic rights as democratic citizens” (Sohn 50) it had the effect of making 
Park’s de facto dictatorship legitimate.   
The backlash to Park’s authoritarian rule post 1972, began to grow exponentially 
at the grassroots level. Forced into the underground, at the risk of their freedom and 
facing the very real possibility of torture or even death, those who yearned for a better 
existence began to solidify their movement. Ironically “as political repression increased 
under the Yushin regime, the dissident movement was not stifled but rather became 
hardened, producing a core or radicalized dissident leaders. Simultaneously, the concept 
of minjung was sharpened into an ideology and a political strategy” (Koo Civil 144).  It 
was paradoxically under this most oppressive of regimes that the minjung movement 
began to take a more definitive shape.  
Availing themselves of the broad scope of influence and power granted by the 
Yushin constitution, the KCIA cracked down harshly on all those whose voices were 
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considered dissident. Such extreme measures helped to solidify the “South Korean 
democratization movement of the 1970s [which] was born out of an intense hatred of the 
Yusin era” (Lee 35).  During the 1970’s, jail cells were overflowing with political 
prisoners and thousands were sentenced to labor camps for their dissent. An almost 
tangible curtain of paranoia had descended upon South Korea under the Park regime.  
Neighbors couldn’t trust that the businessman or housewife next door wouldn’t betray 
criticisms of the regime uttered in confidence. Patrons of restaurants or bars whose 
tongues had loosened from the consumption of too much rice wine had to always be 
mindful of prying eyes and ears, lest a clouded moment of judgment come back to haunt 
them.  
It is no wonder then, in such an environment, that independent student groups 
from local universities had to use the utmost caution in accepting members into their 
inner circles to discuss matters that were anti-state. Junior members had to be vouched 
for by senior participants in order to be accepted, creating a senior/junior bond that was 
very filial in nature and served to forge deep and lasting relationships. Such “ties were the 
gateway to the movement” (Lee 161), often guiding the ideological leanings of the junior 
members as they became more active minjung participants. These inner circles often 
sought to rectify a history of oppression through a rogue nationalistic approach to 
scholarly texts and revisited modes of cultural expression from traditional folkore. These 
nationalist minded minjung were “interested not only in political activism but also in a 
culture that embodie[d] counter-hegemonic oppositional practices of life in order to 
account for the long durations in history when minjung. . . remained silent and their 
political practices . . . unrecorded” (Abelman 26). The extreme suppression efforts of the 
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Park regime only seemed to strengthen the resolve of its adherents (rather than extinguish 
the minjung movement). During the 1980s the silent voices of oppressed minjung began 
to more actively work in concert to revitalize their movement through intricate webs of 
underground support. 
 
Ideology of the Minjung 
The ideological underpinnings of the minjung movement have been described as the 
struggle to rise as a group against a tyrannical oppression found in the works of Marxist 
ideology resonated especially strongly with many in the minjung movement.  Under the 
iron-fisted guidance of Park during the Yushin years, Korea’s rapid ascent to an industrial 
powerhouse was astonishing but hardly complete. For those left behind during this 
unprecedented transition, many shared a feeling of disenfranchisement and alienation. To 
the oppressed intellectuals, the words of Karl Marx became a call to fight against 
despotism and cruelty. Such feelings were echoed in the sentiment of minjung scholars in 
the 1980s like Cho Hunyon who believed that it was essential to “equate class liberation 
with national liberation,” as the entire country of South Korea could in essence be viewed 
as a “neocolonized class”: he felt that the Korean brand of capitalism was merely a thinly 
veiled variant of imperialism (Wells 13). Cho believed that a “minjung revolution” (qtd. 
In Wells 13) had brought the nation to this stage of class liberation.  
 Although Marxist texts were illegal, many minjung risked jail-or worse- in order 
to spread Marxist scholarship throughout the underground student movement. The appeal 
towards Marxism, considering the political landscape of South Korea in the 1980s, seems 
understandable, but some in the Minjung movement embraced an ideological approach 
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more taboo than Marxism by turning towards North Korea’s Chuch’e  (self-reliance) 
ideology .  
North Korea had become the defacto enemy of the South Korean state after the 
1953 armistice and its brand of communism/Marxism/Chuch’e ideology was portrayed 
by the South Korean government as the epitome of all things anathema to South Korean 
democracy. There was no transgression considered more obscene in pre-democratic 
South Korea than voicing support for North Korean ideology. Kim Il-Song had crafted a 
cult of personality that placed him prominently in the role of the ‘Great Leader’.   Kim 
had his own take on Marxist/Leninist philosophy which had been the ideological 
underpinnings of North Korea since its inception a view centered strongly on the concept 
of self-reliance or Chuch’e ideology. The extreme isolationalism practiced by the North 
Korean state typifies this type of ‘bunker mentality’ of 'us' against 'them' so essential to 
the maintenance of the totalitarian regime. While fear, oppression and force were facts of 
daily life in North Korea, some minjung adherents in the 1980’s looked up to North 
Korea’s strong message of self reliance and its stance on the rejection of western 
imperialism. Such concepts seemed to fit neatly into the minjung theme of righting the 
wrongs of history and asserting independence from the great powers which had always 
been such a dominating force throughout much of Korea’s existence.   
The appeal of the Marxist/Leninist/Chuch’e ideological call to rise up against 
oppression was obvious. The minjung saw themselves as an exploited and subjugated 
class who must fight against tyranny in order to survive. The contraband ideologies being 
disseminated through college campuses gave voice to the collective sense of 
powerlessness and frustration felt by the minjung. The thoughts captured in the 
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revolutionary writings of these prohibited bodies of work resonated strongly with the 
minjung who felt that action against the regime was essential and inevitable. With the 
introduction of photo copier machines, translated works of illegal texts began to circulate 
throughout the minjung community with much greater frequency becoming mandatory 
reading for those in the movement. With such increased dissemination and acceptance, 
student activists began to be emboldened in expressing their support of state banned 
ideologies. Flyers started to pop up on the bulletin boards of elite college campus 
denouncing the Korean government, imperialist America’s influence and questioning the 
rejection by the South of Chuch’e ideology. With scars of a not so distant colonial past 
fresh in the minds of many in the minjung movement, the perceived imperialistic 
transgressions of the United States was seen as one more insult against Korean 
sovereignty. It was not the culture or people of America that minjung activists found so 
abhorrent, but rather the role that US policy played in stifling the Korean dream for 
democracy.  
 
Kwangju and Minjung  
The motivations of the Minjung changed profoundly after the Kwangju uprising. Some 
scholars viewed Kwangju as “an event that incubate[d] the minjung’s will for 
revolutionary struggle” (qtd. In Jungwoon  34). No longer satisfied with critique of 
oppression the minjung desired to rise against tyranny and alter the face of South Korea 
for the people. After Kwangju, the United States found itself a target of the proposed 
revolution. Overt criticism of the United States had not been foreign to the minjung 
movement prior to the 1980’s in South Korea, but it was not a driving force that garnered 
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wide support. In fact, many dissident intellectuals previously saw the United States as a 
source of support for the push for democracy and an ally in the fight against tyranny.  The 
cleavage between this romantic view and reality is epitomized by an infamous quote from 
general John A. Wickham Jr, (then) commander of US forces in Korea who stated in a 
New York Times interview in October of 1980 that “Koreans are like field mice, they just 
follow whoever becomes their leader. Democracy is not an adequate system for Koreans” 
(Cummings A17).   
It was not until after the bloodshed of Kwangju had subsided that South Koreans 
began to reassess their relationship and views towards the U.S. Debate over whether or 
not the U.S. Army explicitly or implicitly had any involvement in sanctioning the 
massacre, or whether or not they bore some form of moral responsibility as the defacto 
military authority in South Korea continues to this day.  Regardless of the reality of any 
U.S. involvement (in the minds of large numbers of Koreans), a verdict of guilt and 
complicity had already been reached.  In that sense, any debate became moot as the 
perception of American involvement in one of the bloodiest events in modern Korean 
history became a cornerstone of minjung protest culture, a cause around which to rally. 
Clearly, at least in the eyes of some of the more active minjung participants, a 
paradigmatic shift had occurred after Kwangju. In an essay published to commemorate 
the 5th anniversary of the uprising, the Chonnam National University General Student 
Association celebrated the revolutionary struggle of the minjung who were “equipped 
with anti-American sentiment and high revolutionary awareness [making] a qualitative 
leap into civil war, the highest form of the minjung revolution” (qtd in Choe 30). The 
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reconstructed historiography of minjung evidenced in the essay points to a rethinking of 
the United States and its perceived complicity in the Kwangju Uprising.   
 Intricately linked to the concept of minjung is the idea of rectifying a ‘failed 
history.’ A belief that by and large Korean sovereignty had been repeatedly compromised 
throughout recent history was shared among the minjung with many participants feeling a 
collective responsibility to do their part to readjust the course of Korean history.  One 
hundred years of living under the shadow of colonization, war and tyranny left a burning 
desire in many minjung to ensure future generations would not have to live in shame of 
freedom unrealized. The minjung movement became the embodiment of South Korea’s 
desire to rise up against oppression, a noble endeavor but one that had fallen short far too 
often since the demise of the Chosŏn Dynasty (1392-1910). Kwangju became the 
archetypal model for what it meant to be minjung. It represented the spirit of the 
movement, the ultimate sacrifice paid for the most noble of causes. The passionate 
disavowal of the Park regime’s authoritarian rule exhibited by the minjung that was so 
pervasive in the 1980s soon began to be directed with equal fervor towards the United 
States specifically because of the events of Kwangju. Forever altering the terrain of 
Korean perception of the U.S., for the minjung, Kwangju had come to symbolize 
everything that was wrong with Korean society. The path to democracy was fraught with 
difficulty and the 1980s saw American policy establish itself as yet another obstacle to 
South Korean democratization.   
 
Minjung and Democratization 
 
In June of 1987, Chun Doo Hwan named retired general Roh Tae Woo the official 
candidate of the Democratic Justice Party. Roh had been integral in orchestrating the 
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coup that had placed Chun in power, a strategic move that enraged many Koreans and 
was a contributing factor to the Kwangju uprising of 1980. An indignant South Korea 
became incensed at the selection of Roh as the Democratic Party’s leader with the 
assumption that this was in essence a maneuver to ensure power stayed in the hands of 
the corrupt autocratic regime.  The minjung movement which had been permeating 
multiple strata of society throughout the 1980s was at a zenith in the summer of 1987.  
The scars of Kwangju still fresh in the minds of the minjung, those in the movement were 
driven by a mandate to correct the failure of history and put an end to the clutch of 
tyranny and avenge the massacre of seven years ago.   Massive protests swept through 
Seoul and other large cities, with citizens, students and activists alike clamoring to make 
their demands for democracy heard. This was the culmination of everything the minjung 
had struggled for and the frenzied activity of the movement was a force completely 
undeniable. It struck a sense of trepidation among those in power and it was “[i]n reality, 
fear of the minjung [that] played an important role in the 1987 nationwide 
democratization campaign. In this sense, Korea’s contemporary democracy has been 
realized at the expense of the bloodshed in Gwangju” (Ch’oe 3).  This fear resulted in 
concessions made by the ruling party to allow democratic elections for the first time since 
the 1960s. The dream of the minjung seemed to have come to fruition. The will of the 
people to fight against a past wrought with defeat and suffering crafted a new narrative 
that was carved into the annals of modern Korean history.   
 The minjung had sought to rebel against subjugation, owing to a feeling of debt to 
the nation to redirect Korean history and restore Korean sovereignty.  While anti-
American protests increased markedly throughout the 1980s, it was democracy that the 
 40
 
minjung fought for and not demise of the U.S.  The United States government became a 
target of the minjung movement for its believed contribution to the Kwangju massacre. 
However, with the enemy at least partially thwarted after 1987 “[t]here was also a 
growing realization among many Korean people that an anti-American minjung ideology 
was largely a hodge podge of inconsistent, contradictory, anti-intellectual slogans” (Oh 
95).  In this sense the minjung ideology which helped to transition South Korea into a 
legitimate democracy lost some of its previous pull. Such minjung sentiments “were 
emotionally appealing” for students and workers suffering at the hands of tyrants but the 
appeal began to diminish upon the realization of democracy (Ibid 95).  The drop off of 
heated minjung protests and social activism demonstrates again the role anti-
Americanism plays in South Korean society. It is an element that waxes and wanes in 
importance but remains tangential to movements which have always been focused 
primarily on South Korea. 
 
Role of Social Movements 
 
The minjung movement was born out of necessity and urgency. The human spirit can 
only be savaged and subjugated for so long before the need to rise and free itself from the 
grip of repression becomes overwhelming.  Such is true for nations as well, and in the 
case of South Korea a breaking point had been reached. The minjung sought to redirect 
the flow of history, altering the currents of perceived failure so that they traveled over 
fresh ground forming eddies that doubled back and gently erased the painful memories of 
colonization, division and democracy lost.  The goal was a re-remembering and 
rethinking of South Korea couched in new modes of thinking shared through the passing 
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of worn texts read in earnest and secrecy. The spirit of the minjung was that of revolution 
and the righteousness felt by its adherents was that of a certainty of purpose almost 
religious in nature.  
That the United States became one of the targets of the minjung in the 1980s was 
not due to an oppositional world view-after all both desired democracy. Rather, the 
actions of the minjung were dictated by a resistance to oppression and staking a claim as 
the rightful heirs to Korean history. The United States, by virtue of its geopolitical 
standing throughout the cold war, was caught in the surge of anti-autocratic fervor that 
had taken hold of South Korea in the 1980s. Perception is reality and after Kwangju the 
U.S. was perceived (rightfully or wrongly) as a supporter of a corrupt dictatorship. To 
that end the United States was viewed as an obstacle to democracy and drew the ire of 
many minjung. It is telling that minjung influence waned after democracy was realized in 
1987. Once again the point becomes clear that anti-Americanism comprised only one 








The Birth of the Citizens Movement and Decline of anti-Americanism 
 
   
The 1980’s in South Korea had been a watershed decade for social activism. Years of 
authoritarian rule had cemented a desire for democracy into the psyche of the general 
populace. Student activism which had first entered the national consciousness in April of 
1960 with the ousting of Rhee Syngman had since become a mainstay of political dissent 
in South Korea. Initially a refuge for intellectual elites to voice criticisms about an 
oppressive ruling government, the protest movement spilled out into society at large in 
the 1980s. The protests before and after the crackdown of Kwangju had begun to 
incorporate a broader range of participants. During the height of the Kwangju massacre, 
the protesters out on the street were both citizens and students. Similarly the twenty 
million plus demonstrators that incapacitated the administrative government in June of 
1987 and eventually forced democratic elections were comprised of multiple segments of 
society all clamoring for democracy. This appropriation of the student protest movement 
by larger and more disparate groups is indicative of a shift away from an elite or 
radicalized minority towards an accepted mainstream ideology.    
Throughout the 1980s this trend continued as dissatisfaction with the ruling 
regime became more common place and widespread. The student movement, although a 
distinct polity in its own right, relied heavily on support from citizens to flourish and 
sustain itself. The remarkable success of the minjung movement in helping to bring about 
democracy in South Korea would not have been possible if the only active participants 
had been university students. While the foot soldiers in the social movements of the 
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1980s were predominately students, owing to their access to ideological texts and highly 
organized communication networks, the ranks of the movement filled with academics and 
citizens alike. Such necessary support from the public is evidenced by the fervent bouts 
of anti-Americanism before democratization and the social disenfranchisement 
afterwards.  As the push to overthrow the Chun regime grew more frenetic in the mid to 
late 1980s, more left leaning groups began to embrace North Korean chuch’e ideology as 
the paradigm for reunification between the two Koreas. These groups saw the United 
States as both the originator of national division and an obstacle to reunification. While 
their views may have been on the extreme end of a diverse spectrum of ideologies they 
were only one variation in a larger movement that comfortably housed many contrasting 
and contradicting world views. All held in common reform and change and democracy 
and as long as that remained true, splinter groups and infighting among the various sub- 
movements were less important than the overall goal which had the popular support of 
the people.  
 
A Changing Era 
After the elections of 1987 the dynamic of the social movement was turned on its head. 
The cause to which generations of dissidents had committed themselves had come to 
fruition. While there was admittedly dissatisfaction with the outcome of the election (a 
ruling party win with only 37% of the vote) citizens had actively participated in free 
elections for the first time in decades.  The unity which had been such a pervasive 
component of the minjung movement began to lose its cohesiveness as the students, who 
were used to passionately fighting for their cause, turned their attentions to reunification. 
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While many South Koreans in the late 1980s and the 1990s may have agreed in principal 
with the idea of reunification, the immediacy with which the students wanted this to take 
place disenfranchised large chunks of their previous support.  
Reunification had been a goal of many in the minjung movement since its 
inception but a decidedly anti-communist state and strict censorship greatly curtailed 
public expression of such sentiments. With the ushering in of democracy, the student 
movement became divided into two distinct groups, the moderate Constituent Assembly 
(CA) and the leftist National Liberation (NL). The NL group felt emboldened to vocalize 
their desires to reunify, and espouse chuch’e sympathetic tirades and protested 
vehemently the hegemonic designs of an imperial America, a goal not shared by the CA 
group. It seemed that a new dawn had arrived for political movements. A professor at 
Korea University in 1988 asserted that “this is the beginning of viewing [history] in a 
new perspective.”  Another ‘revisionist’ history professor from the same University 
posited the view that “the American role in the division {of Korea} is the base of the 
students' anti-Americanism,” and that it was ”the U.S. support for the Chun Doo Hwan 
regime [that served] as the detonator” (Washington Post 1988).  Such opinions are clearly 
an extension of goals and attitudes of the minjung movement throughout the 1980s, but 
now they stood on their own without the romantic trappings of the fight for democracy 
serving as a buffer between radical left and moderate middle. Having ostensibly achieved 
democracy, the slogans and chants of the late 1980s social movements had begun to ring 
hollow for many Koreans. A student activist interviewed in 1988 acknowledged that “we 
are worried because of the cold reaction from the people,” a comment that highlights the 
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fact that while students may not be quick to acknowledge it, “their protests only bring 
about change when the public is standing behind them” (Chira  A12). 
In 1989, two high profile arrests of reunification advocates created a media frenzy 
that portrayed North Korean sympathizers in a harshly negative light and drew a rather 
apathetic response from the general public. National Council of Student Representatives 
member Im Soo Kyung and Reverend Moon Ik Hwan were arrested on August 15th for 
violating national security law and traveling to North Korea. Reverend Moon was a 
notorious dissident who had had previous brushes with the law in his pursuit of a 
reunification agenda. Im Soo Kyung was a college student who traveled to North Korea 
to participate in the World Festival of Youth and Students event because it was believed 
that her “participation could be a significant medium in expanding the anti-U.S. and pro-
reunification movement” (Choi H.  184).  Protests of the arrests ensued, but it was not 
with the same surge of mass support from citizens that students witnessed two years prior 
in the summer of 1987. In December 1989 the editor of the student paper at Korea 
University commented that “it is getting harder and harder to get students to rally around 
political causes now, as [s]tudents are becoming selfish and uninterested (Breen A40).  
The death of seven police officers in a fire started from a molotov cocktail thrown by a 
student in 1989 further exacerbated the widening rift between radical student groups and 
the general populace who were growing tired of such extreme measures. It was this lack 
of connection between the leftist leanings of the more active student groups and their 






This trend of evaporating support continued into the 1990s “as the minjung movement 
was systemically undermined as growing middle-class antipathy towards radical student 
ideologies and activism was encouraged by “conservative forces in the media” (qtd in 
Prey 2004).  This is not to say that there were not periodic instances throughout the 1990s 
that garnered attention. In the summer of 1996 student activists calling for reunification 
and an end to the national security law were involved in a fierce physical confrontation 
with law enforcement officers at Yonsei University in an attempt to walk to the DMZ to 
greet fellow students returning from a North Korean rally (ibid 2004).  These instances 
still received media attention; however they failed to garner the sympathies of the public 
the way they once had.  
The 1990s became a period of shifting paradigms in social movements. The 
decline in popularity of the minjung and student movements gave way to a shimin (시민) 
or citizen movement that became the primary force behind social change throughout the 
1990s. There is a continuity between the minjung and citizen movements as many of the 
leaders of the citizen movement were once political activists in the 1980s who no longer 
felt connected to the increasingly extreme student movement. Therefore the new 
movement contrasts from that of the minjung in that it “differs not only from those of the 
revolutionary political movement but also from radical political activism” (Kim D. 3). 
The citizen movement really began to take off “with anti-foreign and national unification 
movements losing their ground”(ibid 3) in the early 1990s and addressed similar concerns 
to that of the minjung movement, but sought institutional “reform” rather than “radical 
transformation of the institutional” (ibid 3). Thus, the leaders of the citizen movement 
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sought to achieve their goals through proceedings and legal actions rather than street 
demonstrations and Molotov cocktails. The face of social movements had changed in the 
eyes of most Koreans, as cries of “yankee go home!” in the streets were replaced by 
peaceful movements taking place out of concern for ordinary citizens, usually associated 
with “consumption, education, housing, the environment, and gender equality” (Shin K. 
6). It was during this time that a respite from the previously ubiquitous anti-American 
protests separated from the concept of social movement.  The 1990s saw an overall drop 
in radical protest and with it overt signs of anti-Americanism. This lull in activity 
contrasts markedly with the massive protests discussed in the following chapter.  
 
Conclusion 
The 1980s were a time of tremendous political and social upheaval. South Korea had 
gone from a nation ruled by an authoritarian regime to the beginnings of democratic 
consolidation. One of the bloodiest civilian massacres in recent memory had served as the 
catalyst for a wave of anti-American protests, slogans and demonstrations as the U.S. fell 
from a position of near reverence in some circles to that of abhorrence in others. The 
1988 Seoul Olympics were held in, an event considered by many to be South Korea’s 
crowning achievement, a hallmark of success. As the last days in that decade waned, a 
new trend began to emerge among the many participants of the minjung movement that 
was moving activists and the general population away the raucous street demonstrations 
that had been so prolific throughout the 1980s.   
While the minjung movement did not fade away entirely, its prominence was 
diminished even as media circus events such as the incarceration of reunification 
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advocate and political dissident Reverend Moon filtered onto millions of TV sets across 
the nation. Former student activists, disenchanted with the increasingly violent and 
extreme tactics utilized by adamant minjung adherents became the leaders of a citizen 
movement that swept across Korea in the 1990s.  This movement preferred the use of 
lawsuits and policy proposals to that of radical revolution and sudden social upheaval 
marking a departure from the anti-American, anti-regime rhetoric that had preceded it. It 
was not until the 1990s had ended that South Korea would again witness a resurgence in 
























Did you see the short-track skating race? 
A vulgar country, Fucking USA 
Are you so happy over a gold medal? 
A nasty country, Fucking USA 
Such as you are, can you claim that the USA is a nation of justice? 
Why the hell can't we say what we have to? 
Are we slaves of a colonial nation? 
Now shout it out: "No to the USA" 
A wretched thief that stole our Olympic gold medal, Fucking USA 
A wicked robber that tries to rob everything by force, Fucking USA 
 
Did you hear Bush's reckless words? 
A shameless country, Fucking USA 
It makes war threats to the north as well as intervention into the south 
A country of gangsters, Fucking USA 
Is the USA still a beautiful country? 
Is the north still an "enemy" to be killed? 
How much more do we have to endure before we realize? 
Now shout it out: "Yankee, go home!" 
You dirty Yankees, wait and see 
We will reunify the country with the independent force of the Korean nation 
We will build a dignified country, a reunified country 
 
 
Remember well our tears of blood 
You, author of Korea's division, Fucking USA 
Don't forget the Nogun-ri massacre of civilians! 
You murderering country, Fucking USA 
 





  The song Fuckin’ USA written in 2002 by activist singer Yoon Min-Suk is 
unabashedly anti-American in tone, yet appropriating a decidedly American genre (rock 
music) to convey anti-Americanism. The above lyrics references several incidents that 
were feeding the frenzied hype around Korean and American relations in 2002. The first 
stanza  addresses the controversy surrounding the men’s 1500-meter speed skating event 
in the 2002 Salt Lake City Winter Olympic games. In that race, Kim Dong-Sung crossed 
the finish line first but was disqualified for blocking American speed skater Apollo Ohno, 
who received the gold when Kim was disqualified. Many Koreans were furious over the 
judges’ decision and flooded the U.S. Olympic Committee server with so many emails 
that it crashed.  
 President Bush’s ‘axis of evil’ speech is condemned: “Did you hear Bush's 
reckless words? A shameless country, Fucking USA. It makes war threats to the north as 
well as intervention into the south. Is the USA still a beautiful country?”  The song 
sarcastically takes issue with the Korean word for the United States (Miguk which 
translates to beautiful country). 
The lines “You dirty Yankees, wait and see. We will reunify the country with the 
independent force of the Korean nation. We will build a dignified country, a reunified 
country” illustrate the determination to create a united Korea, a goal that the song’s 
author obviously feels is impeded by the United States. The idea of independence 
addressed in the song is a reflection of the sense of struggling national identity shared by 
many activists who long to create a new narrative with a fiercely independent and proud 
Korea. The third stanza references a Korean War mass killing of Korean civilians.The 
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song ends with placing the blame for Korean division squarely on the United States and 
rehashes old ideas about American collusion with enemies of Korea.   
The above song encapsulates a mounting sense of frustration that was prevalent 
with an increasing number of South Koreans in the summer of 2002. The decade before 
had seen a relative decline in overt acts of anti-Americanism with a shifting focus to 
more explicitly domestic concerns through legal avenues as opposed to street 
demonstrations. The song became a viral internet hit in 2002, evidence of a shift in 
modes of communication for a new generation.  
 
Anti-Americanism via Cyber Space 
From the late 1970s through the late 1980s, anti-Americanism in South Korea was largely 
relegated to elite college classrooms and clandestine student gatherings that were for the 
most part inaccessible to the general public. The internet era that began to permeate 
Korean society during the 1990s allowed for technological advances in modes of 
communication that suddenly opened up numerous channels of information for a vast 
majority of Koreans. Soon, online media began to appear on the internet, setting the stage 
for online activism and allowing social movements to reach large swaths of the 
population in ways previously unimagined.  
Perhaps the most notorious of Korea’s new online media is OhmyNews, an 
internet based citizen journalist enterprise, whose “success in exercising progressive 
influence is the result of the social and political conditions of Korea’s recent history” 
(Kim E. 553).  The brainchild of leftist media hawk Oh Yeon Ho, OhMyNews was 
founded in 2000 with a handful of ‘citizen journalists’ intent on reshaping the entrenched 
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mediascape of political conservatism. Oh did not have to wait long to realize the fruits of 
his labor. 
The success of these activists in mobilizing and shaping Korean public opinion 
relied heavily on the participation of South Korea’s ‘netizens,’ typically younger, more 
progressively minded and technologically savvy.  One of the most wired nations in the 
world (see graph above from Korean Internet Statistics Information System ISIS, 
International Telecommunication Union as compiled by Joyce), South Korea is the ideal 
breeding ground for the hybridization of the internet and alternative forms of media. 
  The anti-US Armed Forces sentiment fostered by the protests were soon 
reinforced through the progressive online media outlets resulting in a surge of anti-
American tinged rhetoric which may have been the tipping point in the election as he was 
behind in the polls just prior to the presidential election.  Grassroots efforts from 
OhmyNews posters however, who saturated the internet with pleas for the youth of Korea 
to vote have been largely credited as the driving force behind Roh’s surprising ascension 
to the Presidency. In a nod to the ‘20 and 30 something’ year old users of OhmyNews 
who played a major role in his election, OhmyNews was granted the first interview by 






In a case study on “the roles of independent online news services as agenda 
builders for anti-US protests in South Korea,” Song noted the apparent correlation 
between the marked increase in coverage of the 2002 schoolgirl incident and a rise in 
protests (figures 1 & 2. Song).  As mentioned above, many believe that it was the online 
news media’s coverage of the incident that forced the conservative major dailies to cover 
the issue. A snowball effect soon ensued with coverage leading to protests which then 
lead to more coverage and more protests and so on.  As OhMyNews was made up of 
everyday ordinary South Korean citizens and provided a wealth of resources to their 
computer screens it had become a vehicle for self expression that offered an ease of 
access to grassroots movements that previous generations had never had. 
 
The Two Girls Incident 
The 2002 death of two school girls run over by a US tank while walking home on a rural 
road 20 miles outside of Seoul sparked an unprecedented wave of anti-American protest 
that swept the entire nation. The protests were the largest such anti-American 
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demonstrations since those seen during at the height of  the minjung movement in the 
1980s and marks a dramatic shift from the American ‘neutral’ 1990s. The deaths 
occurred during the World Cup and initially received little media attention from 
traditional conservative media outlets. In the tradition of the minjung from a generation 
before, grassroots activism (this time in cyber space) became a driving force for shaping 
the socio-political environment. In South Korea “use of electronic information systems 
have produced a rapid, efficient, and powerful system of forming public opinions on 
various issues” (Shin Correlates 31).  
 The summer before the November 2002 presidential elections had ushered in a 
wave of excitement and nationalism as South Korea hosted the World Cup jointly with 
Japan and performed much better than expected. Thrilled to experience history in the 
making “it was the first time in anyone’s recent memory that Koreans came together not 
to oppose someone or something, be it a dictator, the communists or insensitive remarks 
made by right Japanese politicians, but simply to celebrate Korea and being Korean” 
(Hahm 224).  
A news story that had taken a back seat to the WorldCcup concerning two young 
middle school girls crushed by American tanks during a routine training exercise 
suddenly exploded into the political discourse as election season got underway. Anti-
Americanism abruptly reentered the spotlight after a relatively dormant period. These 
protests seemed to draw energy from the charged atmosphere of just a few weeks earlier. 
The palpable and pervasive shared elation and surging sense of national pride that was 
engendered by South Korea’s unexpected success in the 2002 World Cup which had 
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drawn hundreds of thousands of South Korean soccer enthusiasts known as ‘Red Devils’ 
to the streets soon took on a more ominous tone. 
Exuberance soon began to fade, as details surrounding the death of the two 
fourteen-year-old school girls began to circulate. Shock and dismay at the loss of 
innocent life quickly changed to outrage and anger after the US soldiers involved in the 
incident were acquitted of all serious charges.  Suddenly Koreans were pouring out of 
their apartments and schools en masse. Some of these candlelight vigils boasted more 
than one million participants and were rapidly flooding the streets of Seoul. Once more 
the specter of anti-Americanism, which had been dormant for several years, reared its 
head. Much like the minjung protests of the 1980s, the candlelight vigils were about more 
than the issue at hand; they became a bitter reminder of a not-too-distant painful past. 
While democracy had been achieved, many Koreans believed that Korea was still not a 
land ruled by Koreans.  The ‘two schoolgirls’ incident and perceived lack of 
accountability had the effect of bringing “back to everyone, including those of the new 
generation, the old sense of futility and helplessness that Koreans had become so 
accustomed to but believed they had recently overcome” (Hahm 224). The protests grew 
to a level that drew the attention of average Americans as evidenced in a 2002 Pew 
Research Center Survey which revealed that Americans believed South Korea to be  “the 
Asian nation most critical of the United States”(qtd in Kim Ambivilant 280). 
Internet powerhouse, OhmyNews has been widely considered to be the driving 
force behind the massive candlelight vigils which were orchestrated and coordinated via 
the internet and are believed by many to be “an example of an OhmyNews reporter 
coordinating offline political action” (Joyce 10).  Such lines between citizen journalists 
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and emotionally driven activism were soon blurred as posts on OhmyNews began to filter 
in: 
            We are owners of Korea. We are Koreans who deserve to be able to 
walk in Gwanghwamun.. I cried when I watched the TV documentary 
broadcast of the event, because until now I didn’t understand those who 
struggle so strongly. 
 
It is said that dead men’s souls become fireflies. Let’s fill downtown 
with our souls, with the souls of Mi-seon and Hyo-soon. Let’s become 
thousands of fireflies this coming Saturday and Sunday. Let’s sacrifice 
our private comfortable lives. Please light your candle at your home. If 
somebody asks, please answer, ‘I'm going to commemorate my dead 
sisters.’ Holding candles and wearing black, let’s have a memorial ceremony for 
them. 
  (Post made by angMA on OhmyNews as quoted  by Ronda Heuben) 
Protesters took to the streets in the thousands the day after ‘angMA’s’ post. The 
sacrifice called for by angMA seemed to resonate with many Koreans. The people of 
South Korea wanted to be in charge of their own destiny and would not sit idly by while 
they watched a miscarriage of justice in their own land by a foreign occupying force. Fear 
of losing a grip on a tenuously positioned sovereignty prompted thousands of South 
Koreans to pick up candles and follow in the footsteps of the generation before them.    
 
The 2002 Elections: the Politics of anti-Americanism 
There is a widely held belief that President Roh Moo Hyun “was elected on a platform 
highly critical of US foreign policy by an increasingly anti-American electorate” 
(O'Conner 230) in 2002. Indeed, this seemed to be the case as the largely youthful 
contingent of supporters were the same demographic seen on nightly newscasts 
participating in anti-American protests in the streets of Seoul. With the introduction of 
anti-American sentiment into the electoral process, the political divide of right vs. left 
became a generational divide as well. Presidential candidate Roh Moo Hyun was a 
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product of the 3-8-6 generation (born in the 60s, student activists in the 80s and in their 
30s in the 1990s) and was the embodiment of the minjung movement which was a 
primary catalyst in the push for democratization in 1987. Nowhere was this generational 
divide more evident than on the internet where scores of ‘netizens’ took to cyber space to 
coalesce around the controversial issues that saturated the 2002 elections in support Roh 
Moo-Hyun. The youth of Korea had found a voice and the birth of new modes of 
communication made expression as easy as a click of a mouse, ushering in an era of 
unprecedented internet activism.  Also, the protests surged around election time and 
fizzled out almost as soon as the elections were over. Given the emotional rhetoric 
espoused by the Roh campaign and the younger, progressive vote, the correlation 
between anti-American sentiment and Roh’s election seems almost intuitive. In 2002, 
Roh Moo Hyun campaigned with the slogans “liquidation of old politics” and 
“generational replacement in politics” (Shin Correlates 29), a phrase that was 
understandably appealing to the younger generation who typically trend towards a more 
progressive political ideology than older voters.  
Reform was a subject weighing heavily on the collective consciousness of many 
Koreans in the summer of 2002 after the two school girls incident. The Status of Forces 
Agreement (SOFA) between the United States and South Korea protected the two US 
soldiers involved in the death of the girls from prosecution under Korean civil law. After 
a trial in American Military courts, it was determined that deaths were accidental and the 
two soldiers involved were acquitted of serious charges in late November and 
subsequently sent back to the U.S. The lack of accountability within the Korean legal 
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system for the deaths infuriated many Koreans and was the impetus for the massive street 
demonstrations that occurred in the just before the elections of 2002.  
A month before the elections were held, Roh was behind significantly in the polls 
and was not favored to win the election. It was not until around the time of the uptick in 
protests that a surge of popularity for Roh became apparent. As stated above, many have 
attributed the success of online grassroots activism in organizing the youth vote to Roh’s 
victory. As protests were growing around the country, Roh could be found on the 
campaign trail promising “the establishment of ‘balanced’ bilateral relations with the 
United States” (Jhee 314), an obvious appeal to the frustrations over the ‘unequal’ SOFA 
agreement with the US.  Roh’s opposition, Lee Hoi Chang, helped make the case for him 
by “demonizing” Roh as an “anti-American politician” (ibid 314).  
There have been several research studies conducted on the prevalence of anti-
American sentiment of voters during the 2002 election that analyzed post election survey 
data to determine what impact anti-Americanism had on voters’ decision-making 
processes. Using questions that were considered “proxies” for anti-Americanism such as 
“what extent they agreed with stationing of US troops in South Korea” and George 
Bush’s “axis of evil” (ibid 314) comments, the author of the aforementioned questions 
concluded that there was not a strong correlation between anti-American sentiment and a 
vote cast for Roh Moo Hyun.  
Given that the data analyzed only indirectly got to the question of “do you hold 
anti-American sentiment,” I believe these analyses mischaracterize the mentality of the 
voters during 2002. This is an important point to grasp as the study infers a lack of anti-
American sentiment in supporters of Roh without any direct evidence. There was 
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obviously a strong connection between anti-American sentiment and support of Roh as 
the demographic protesting the U.S. and voting for Roh were one and the same,      
largely youthful and progressive-a contrast to the older generation that tended to hold  
more typically 'pro-American' views.  However, this once again illustrates a unique 
characteristic of South Korean anti-Americanism. Voters who supported Roh did 
demonstrate against the United States, burn US flags and fight with riot police. These 
same voters did not necessarily have a problem with the US being stationed in South 
Korea. The key issue is one of national identity and sovereignty. The US was protested 
against because of what many Koreans believed was an unfair SOFA agreement that 
treated South Korea as an unequal partner, one that was forced to kowtow before the 
mighty US. This sentiment fits exactly the mood of the minjung movement of the 1980s 
and the frustrations of South Korean social movements over the last forty years whose 
main concern was Korean identity and sovereignty. It is not the case that anti-
Americanism had no impact on the voting block in 2002. Rather it was South Korean 
anti-Americanism in its typical form that motivated youthful progressive-minded voters 
to express themselves by casting ballots for change. 
 
Beef Protests 
The landslide victory by current President Lee Myung Bak had been seen by many as 
ushering in a new era of conservatism and a political shift from the progressive left. The 
perceived failure of the previous administration to adequately address economic concerns 
laid the groundwork for President Lee’s rise to power despite the cloud of a fraud 
investigation hanging over his head during the election. The inauguration of a 
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conservative president into office would seem to convey the message that the South 
Korean public at large is content with a return to a more pro-American government and 
perhaps more tolerant of a hard line approach towards North Korea. The political left, 
however, soon capitalized on an opportunity to humiliate President Lee and seized upon 
negotiations between President Lee and President Bush reopening old wounds of Korean 
sovereignty.  
By allowing American beef to reach once more the shelves of Korean grocery 
stores and the tables of Korean households, President Lee had made concessions that 
Japan and Taiwan had not, which is to allow US beef to be imported into Korea that was 
less than 20 months old. The political protest laden maelstrom that ensued caught the 
administration completely off guard. The issues involved run much deeper than beef and 
focus on much more than the anti-American sentiment that at first glance seemed to fuel 
the activist movement.  
 Only days into his presidency, Lee Myung Bak found himself confronted with his 
first major crisis as protesters once more took to the streets.  In response to President 
Lee’s decision to reopen American beef imports, hundreds of thousands of Korean 
citizens demonstrated their displeasure, holding candle light vigils and even burning 




Mad Cow Disease: Die or           
go crazy 
 
(Images from http://populargusts.blogspot.com/2008/05/branding-mad-cow.html accessed April 4th 2009) 
  
With images of angry and sometimes violent protests regarding the decision to 
import an American product peppering the US media in the summer of 2008, it is not   
surprising that such actions have been interpreted by many to be yet another 
manifestation of deep rooted anti-Americanism. A deeper examination suggests that “at   








(Image from http://61.19.218.149/journal/enjournal/e5/2008/171_6/t171_6.pdf accessed April 4th, 2009) 
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that runs roughshod over Korean national sovereignty” (Cummings Beef 1).  
Issues of sovereignty have been haunting Korean citizens for generation upon 
generation and independence is one of the central pillars of the activist platform. It makes 
sense, then, that few are willing to stand quietly while the progress achieved from the 
social movements of the 1980s is undone in the name of politics.    
 Sparked by claims from a popular Korean investigative TV show that Koreans are 
somehow genetically more susceptible to Mad Cow disease than other ethnic groups, and 
that Americans were not even eating the beef they were exporting to Korea, Koreans 
turned out to participate in some of the largest protest movements since the 1987 
democratization movement (Beck 15; Ramstad A11). Upset at a president whom many 
considered “weak” for concessions to Washington, hundreds of thousands of Koreans 
marched through Seoul to make their voices heard (Ramstad A11). Among the 
complaints were allegations that “the US wanted to send ‘garbage the Americans will not 
eat’” an image flying directly in the face of a Korean desire to be treated as an equal 
sovereign nation (Kirk 11).  
Also of concern to some participants was the potential damage that could be done 
to Korea’s farmers. According to a spokesman from the group, Solidarity for the Progress 
of Korea, “the farm industry is not ready for trade protections to be taken away” (ibid 
A12).  Although the subject of tainted US beef galvanized the public to protest, the issues 
at the heart of the matter are more directly tied to Korean sovereignty. The candle holders 
and sign wavers were not demonstrating their hatred or disapproval of the United States,  
but rather seeking to address grievances they had concerning the state of their own 
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government and it's relation to the Unite States through the Status of Forces Agreement 
which has a direct impact on a modern independent South Korea. 
 Although protests centered on an import seems little enough cause for concern 
(even one potentially carrying mad cow disease), some scholars have pointed to a 
continuing manifestation of a new form of anti-Americanism suggesting “that a small 
matter of beef imports has put masses of Koreans into the streets and threatens to trample 
the very foundations of Korean-American relations” (Cummings Beef 1). By contrast, 
others feel such claims are complete mischaracterizations of the situation, noting that “in 
2002 many politicians (most famously Roh Moo Hyun during his run for president) had 
proudly brandished anti-American sentiments; in 2008 no one made moves overtly to 
take advantage of radical nationalism” (Hahm 141). Rather, protest over beef imports is 
indicative of the fact that “in six short years, radical nationalism went from being the 
most visible and potent political sentiment in South Korea to one that had to be disguised 
as concern over concrete policy issues” (141). It may be, however, that expressions of 
nationalism have begun to mature and protests like that over mad cow disease are the 
new face of dissent in South Korea.  
While it is certainly too early to assert definitively that South Korea has seen the 
end of radical nationalism, even a temporary decline in such activity supports the view 
that anti-Americanism is not a primary force in and of itself but rather an expression of a 
nation on a path towards decolonization, democratic consolidation and a restructured 






The 2002 presidential election in South Korea once again brought anti-Americanism to 
the forefront of the arenas of public and political discourse. The death of two young 
school girls seemed to polarize a nation along ideological and generational lines. Massive 
protests paralyzed downtown Seoul for days on end. The youth vote, energized by an 
online movement unprecedented in scope, came out in great numbers to support the 
progressive candidate and elect him on a platform of anti-Americanism. When seen in 
this light, it would be easy for a casual observer to make the case anti-Americanism is a 
mainstay of modern Korean society. After all, how else could one explain the hate filled 
song lyrics, burning effigies of George Bush, the cries of “Yankee go home!”? Without 
question all of these things happened and more. Even years after the fact, shades of anti-
Americanism can be found in popular culture and elsewhere in Korean society. Despite 
the apparent harshness and popularity of such sentiment, the ebb and flow of anti-
Americanism is indicative of a different construct. The death of the school girls was 
tragic, but the protests centered more on the perception that the perpetrators were above 
the law. To many it seemed that they had escaped justice because of an ‘unfair’ status of 
forces agreement was the galvanizing force that led to the candlelight vigils.  It was not 
opposition to the United States on a deep rooted basis or rejection of American culture, 
values or principles that caused the uproar. Instead it was the painful reminder of a 
history of national crisis.  
Koreans had suffered at the hands of larger forces dating back to its relationship 
with imperial Japan, and up to the national division by Superpowers.  Even after 
democratization and what has often been referred to as the ‘economic miracle’ of South 
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Korean development, here was evidence that true sovereignty was still not in the hands of 
South Koreans. Harking back to the minjung movement of the 1980s, South Koreans 
were once more acutely cognizant of the struggles of decolonization and the search to 
construct an overarching narrative of a completely independent Korea free from the 
oppressive dominant forces that had dictated existence on the peninsula for over 100 
years.  
Anti-Americanism in South Korea as illustrated by the above examples are 
merely pieces of a much more complex puzzle. It is the larger concern of constructing an 
independent modern Korea that is the primary focus of South Korean social activism. 
Anti-Americanism in this sense goes hand in hand with the search for Korean national 
identity.  As the nation continues to grow and its democracy evolves and matures so too 
will its attitudes towards the United States. If the relatively civil beef protests of 2008 are 
any indication of future trends, anti-American sentiment in South Korea is likely to see a 
decrease in support from radical social movements. Thanks in part to a shift away from  
extremist movements issues related to Korea’s progressing democracy are likely to  play 












 Anti-Americanism is a phenomenon that has existed almost as long as America 
itself. Theories regarding the root cause of anti-Americanism are numerous and range 
from reactive to policy driven to scapegoating and more. Trying to forge a single 
descriptive concept detailing what specifically constitutes anti-Americanism in all of its 
various manifestations is an undertaking tremendously broad in scope and not likely to 
produce a definitive answer. For example, there are certainly adamant anti-Americanists 
who hate the United States because of its standing in the world as a superpower. Also, 
unquestionably, there are nations whose governments profess an ideological opposition to 
the principles upon which America was founded. Recently it became chic, if not cliché, 
to bemoan the numerous international rifts created from policies enacted during the Bush 
administration, a clear example of reactive theory.  In whatever context anti-
Americanism occurs, the difficulty in deconstructing the root causes is that most analyses 
do not offer a comprehensive overview of the scope of anti-Americanism. Therein lies 
the most difficult aspect of evaluating multiple spheres of anti-Americanism: it is many 
things to many people at the same time.  
Ironically, the most common thread connecting various approaches to anti-
Americanism is that there is not currently a theory with a conclusive answer. It is the 
amorphous nature of anti-Americanism that varies from nation to nation and even within 
countries and between groups that makes it such a difficult puzzle to piece together.  This 
lack of scholarly consensus is indicative of the complexities inherent in attempting to 
solve the problem of ‘what is anti-Americanism.’ The fact that the debate on anti-
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Americanism has not produced any definitive answers does not mean that the discussion 
is without merit. It is precisely the complexity of anti-Americanism that allows us to 
probe deeper into its meaning from multiple vantage points. While untangling the 
convoluted contortions of anti-Americanism as it exists throughout the world is a worthy 
enterprise, the goal of this study is to shed light on what anti-Americanism means in 
South Korea.  
Modern history has presented South Korea with numerous challenges that predate 
its formal status as a nation. Colonization, the attempted eradication of the Korean 
language and culture, civil war, poverty and dictatorship constitute what many in the 
minjung movement saw as evidence of a failed history and a contested sovereignty.  
Increasingly frustrated with a series of autocratic regimes, a grassroots-oriented 
underground collection of intellectuals and students began in earnest to shoulder the 
responsibility for setting Korean historiography on its proper course. Starting with the 
ousting of Rhee Syngman in 1960, participants in these social movements often felt a 
sense of grave responsibility for their role in redefining Korea’s national identity. Hidden 
largely from the light of day and facing persecution by the KCIA, social activists burst 
onto the national scene with the assassination of President Park Chung Hee in 1979. 
Seizing upon the opportunity for a chance to reclaim Korea for the people, students, 
professors, intellectuals, laborers and other citizens began to coalesce around the prospect 
of democracy. After General Chun Doo Hwan established himself as the de facto leader 
of South Korea in what was essentially a bloodless coup, the energies directed towards 
democracy began to include protest. With an iron fist, general Chun violently stamped 
out the Movement, most forcibly in Kwangju, with enormous civilian casualties as a 
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result. This was the tipping point for anti-Americanism in South Korea. Prior to 
Kwangju, America was seen as a shining beacon to many intellectuals and was hardly 
ever disparaged, even among social activists. This attitude was shattered after Kwangju. 
The massacre raised questions about the reasons for America’s notable absence during 
the military crackdown. The perception was that Americans were ultimately in charge of 
the Korean military. It seemed logical to many Koreans that even if the Americans did 
not directly authorize the killings, they surely knew what was happening and chose not to 
intercede and were therefore complicit in Kwangju. The veracity of this position matters 
not nearly as much as its acceptance among the general populace. The United States did 
not help the Korean people in their time of need and therefore lost its standing in the eyes 
of many South Koreans.  
So this view of the United States continued throughout the 1980s as the minjung 
movement grew in size and the push for democracy became ever stronger. In the summer 
of 1987, the minjung finally achieved everything they had been working for for so long. 
Democratic elections were held as an almost direct consequence of the actions of the 
minjung and other democratic social movements. Once the dust settled in the late 1980s, 
however, the extremist bouts of apparent anti-Americanism that had fueled so many 
Molotov cocktails and protest songs had seemed to run out of steam for the minjung and 
the citizens’ movement took hold. The reason is that anti-Americanism in South Korea is 
more than a black and white issue with clear lines of demarcation dividing pro and anti 
American camps. South Koreans wanted to take charge of their own history and move 
beyond the failures of the past towards a truly sovereign democratic future. Activists soon 
turned to issues such as reunification, which was taboo prior to democratization. 
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The appearance of a marked surge of anti-Americanism again in the summer of 
2002 only serves to further illustrate the point that such protests are about much more 
than the United States. The death of two young school girls run over by a US tank 
saddened the nation, but what drove its citizens to action was the release of the soldiers 
involved.  This went straight to the heart of national identity and sovereignty, issues that 
have been central to social activism in South Korea for decades. While the protesters 
burned American flags and gathered around US military bases, the streets were packed 
with more than radical protestors who held fierce oppositional views to the United States. 
These rallies also consisted of citizens who saw cracks in the fragile democratic 
sovereignty they had fought so hard to secure. They saw a nation that had come of age 
but was still locked in an outdated, unequal partnership with a larger power, a painful 
reminder of a colonial past.  
The apparent contradictions of the voting motivations of Roh’s youthful 
supporters in the 2002 elections serve to highlight the issues surrounding sovereignty and 
national identity.  Individuals who protested against the US and the SOFA did not 
necessarily want the American troops gone from their nation. The concerns were more 
complex than media clips of anti-American protests seemed to suggest. It was once again 
Korean national identity that was at stake. Anti-Americanism did play a role in the 
elections but only as a vehicle to express deeper anxieties about Korean national identity 
and the unequal relationship of the Status of Forces Agreement.  
In the years since the ‘two-girls’ incident, anti-American sentiment has seemed to 
fade from the main arena of socio-political discourse. The recent beef protests were more 
about the perception of President kowtowing in an unequal relationship with disregard for 
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welfare of the people. To be sure, this was an issue that happened to involve the United 
States, but it was not a function of a deep-seated dislike for America. This ebb and flow 
of anti-American sentiment, that at times seems to reach dangerous crescendos, is part of 
South Korea’s gaining confidence and desire for construction of a new national identity, a 
historiography that moves beyond years of contested sovereignty towards a triumphant 
and autonomous South Korea. Anti-Americanism in Korea has existed “more as a 
positive projection of Korean nationalism rather than a negative reaction to specifically 
American Culture” (Robertson 5). We may very well see another spike in anti-
Americanism in the near future, triggered by a specific event or a reaction to policy.  It is 
my view, however, that as South Korea matures and the United States policy towards 
South Korea evolves to treat South Korea as more of an equal partner these anti-
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